Institutional change and development towards sustainability by Opschoor, J.B.
CT' 
u
 -"aculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie 
Q53m 
lm
 Serie Research Memoranda 
^ M INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY 
J.B. Opschoor 
Research Memorandum 1994-42 
october 1994 
vrije Universiteit amsterdam 

1 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY 
J (Hans). B. Opschoor, 
Professor of environmental economics 
Free University Amsterdam 
Free University Amsterdam 
Faculty of Economics/Dep't of Spatial Economics/Ecological Economics Group 
De Boeielaan 1105 
1185 HV Amsterdam 
fax: #31-20-4446005 
email: jopschoor@econ.vu.nl 
2 
_li Introduction1 
'Sustainable development' is defined by the WCED as: "... a process of change in which the 
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development 
and institutional change ... enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and 
aspirations" 2. It thus is a concept that is related to the continuing existence of conditions favoura-
ble to life, human life in particular. It has to do with fairness or equity (especially, though not 
exclusively) in an intertemporal or intergenerational sense, and with the integrity of natural systems 
and processes (at least from an instrumental perspective and as perceived by Homo sapiens. 
In the definition g'wen, institutions have an explicit role to play and this paper takes lts cue from 
there. The predominant institutions infiuencing decision making (i.e. market forces and market-based 
mechanisms) are geared towards efficiency almost at the exclusion of other values sucft as 
sustainability and equity. The importance of market-oriented institutions has even tended to increase 
over the past decades, especially since 1989. This is one of the realities people and nations are 
facing. At the international level, recent developments related to wortd trade illustrate this (the 
Uruguay Round, the setting up of the new World Trade Organisation). 
In trying to give operational meaning to the notion of sustainability, several important issues must be 
addressed. 
First, some agreement has to be reached on what the substance is of this notion: what are the 
'dimensions' of sustainability and how can we capture this multidimensional concept? Somewhere 
between these two steps of kJentifying dimensions and finding measuring rods, there is a relatively 
value loaded intermediate step: that of setting thresholds or critical values: benchmarks on those 
measuring rods indicating, for each dimension, where the sustainable domain ends and the 
unsustainable domain begins. 
Second, how can societies or economies move towards (more) sustainable states? Will individual 
decision makers be moving towards more sustainable ways of using natural resources automatically? 
Can the values and preferences underlying their decisions be influenced? Are changes necessary in 
incentive systems at the meso and macro level in order to effectively and adequately alter decsisi-
ons? Are other, more fundamentai institutional changes necessary? Is the global or international 
economie and institutional 'environment' conduefve to, and sufficiënt for achieving sustainability? 
A third set of questions relates to the costs and benefits of a business-as-usual type of development 
versus a sustainability-oriented scenario: what are the sacrifices in terms of income and consumption 
to whom, and when? What are the differences between these scenarios in terms of economie values 
of the various environmental states? And how are these distributed in time and space? What then are 
the tradeoffs decision makers are faced with when conskJering alternative development paths? What 
mechanisms for 'burden sharing' exist or should be developed so as to achieve and facilitate an 
optimal and adequate response to the threats of unsustainability? 
Fourth, do our strategies address the main driving forces behind unsustainability? What are these 
driving forces? What 'undercurrents' and socio-economic structures enhance these driving forces? 
Can these be addressed? 
Within the above 'agenda' for operationalising sustainability, this paper provides one attempt to 
further the debate about the institutional conditions that prevail and on how institutional change 
might foster sustainable development and development towards sustainability. That is, especially the 
second question and parts of the fourth question will be taken up. We cannot, however, proceed 
with a minimum amount of attention to the notion of sustainability itself. 
2^ Sustainability 
The systems and processes that operate in the physical environments of society, enable the 
environment to provide to society a range of functions or services, including the self-regulation of 
.these systems and processes, the production of materials, and carrier functions3. Looked at from 
an anthropocentric perspective, the environment could be regarded as a complex life support 
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system; the complexity arising, inter alia, from the inter-relationships between the various systems 
and processes sustaining the environment's capacity to perform these functions. Reduced to their 
most basic essentials, one could conceive of this life support system as made up of four elements: 
(i) a renewable resource that is harvested by society, (ii) its underiying regeneration process (say, a 
Lotka-Volterra stock growth function), (iii) environmental pressure and (iv) an absorption process. 
Effective regeneration (or the productivity of the regeneration system) can be assumed to depend on 
environmental quality which, in turn, is a function of environmental pressure and the scale and rate at 
which absorption processes in the environment buffer that pressure. Harvesting from the environ-
ment and putting waste into it (elements i and iii above) represent the ways in which society utiiises 
the environment. Regeneration and absorption and other processes such as regulatory ones, 
together form the so-called 'life support' function of the environment; they can be referred to as the 
'ecological infrastructure'4. 
If one analyses environmental utilisation in this simple framework, the result is literally a space, the 
boundaries of which represent environmental use patterns (in terms of combinations of resource 
stock levels, environmental quality and resource extraction rates) that can be maintained since the 
underiying ecological infrastructure remains in tact. If one assumes that lower levels of environmental 
quality are associated with reduced productivity of the regenerative process, then this space takes 
on the shape of a vault with a height and width that decrease as environmental pressure increases. 
This space has been called the environmental utilisation space (or EUS5): the range of different 
interactions between society and the environment that are all "ecologically sustainable" (in the sense 
that they preserve the ecological infrastructure). More precisely, the environmental space is defined 
as: 
the locus of all feasible combinations of environmental services that represent 
steady states in terms of levels of relevant environmental quality and stocks of 
renewable resources*. 
The notion of an environmental space of given magnitude still allows for the adoption by society of a 
wide range of more or less attractive, steady state positions, and it allows for economie growth. 
More attractive steady state positions can be reached at the cost of temporary sacrifices in terms of 
reductions in environmental utilisation. Moreover, social and technological ertange may expand (in 
real terms or virtually) the environmental space, and society can deliberately invest in that. And 
finally, even if further expansion of the environmental space would eventually become impossible, 
this would oniy pose a limit on environmental utilisation (or 'material throughput' or 'metaboiism'7) 
and not necessarily on economie development or economie growth in welfare terms. 
EUS and 'sustainable development' are related concepts. The EUS theoretically embraces an infinite 
number of patterns of environmental utilisation that are all -by definition- steady states. They may, 
however, differ greatly in their degree of desirability, especialiy in the iight of considerations such as 
population growth, global inequality, etc. On the other hand, if one takes a long term perspectfve, 
desirable or socially acceptable patterns of environmental utilisation may not be ecologically feasible. 
Society therefore has to ident'rfy and move towards a feasible and acceptable level of environmental 
utilisation that it wishes to enjoy sustainably - tf such a level that is both acceptable and sustainable 
exists8. 
'Weak' or 'strong' sustainability 
It is conceivable that one natural resource replaces the other (e.g. sugar cane as a substitute for 
fossil energy). When resources can thus be replaced, the unsustained use of a particular resource 
may not pose a problem in terms of economie survival of the actfvities using that resource. As long 
as the natural resource base in total is preserved, there is no question as to the sustainability of 
using it. 
Substitution options might aiso exist between natural resources and non-natural ones, such as 
produced capital, knowiedge and know-how. And technological development or innovation may even 
lead to an expanded range of perceived options for substitution of one resource for another. It may 
thus appear to be more advantageous to sell or burn up a given fossil energy resource or cut a 
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forest, and Invest the revenues in the development of alternative natural resources or even of artificial 
ones, than to preserve the resource. Economists, in addressing the notion of sustainability, often feel 
inclined to transform into one aggregate economie value (expressed in monetary terms) natural 
resource stocks as well as produced capital (in the form of equipment, road, etc.) and human capital 
(in the form of schools, research, etc) *. In this approach, degrading environmental features is then 
considered acceptable as long as: (i) this is 'compensated' by some form of increased produced 
capital, or enhanced intellectual capabilities, and (ii) the welfare potential of the overall capital base 
(of which environmental capital is but one component) remains intact. In this view, development can 
be regarded as sustainable while at the same time the environmental space is allowed to diminish. 
This is called 'weak sustainability' and one finds it refiected implicitly in the WCED-definition and in 
e.g., World Bank positions10. 
Opposed to this is the view that this faith in the substitutability of human made processes for natural 
ones may be unwarranted, and that the promise of technological innovation cannot balance 
environmental degradation. Both prudence considerations and preservation considerations based on 
the 'rights' to existence and development of non-human species and natural systems, may lead to a 
choice in favour of what nas been called 'strong' sustainability. For renewable resources this 'strong' 
approach entails that: (i) the stock levels to be maintained must be high enough to safely ensure a 
sustainable offtake at at least the current level, and (ii) the quality of the regenerative systems 
instrumental in regrowth processes be maintained beyond safe minimum levels of environmental 
quality. Environmental poll ut ion and waste would then be allowed only in so far prudently (i.e. in a 
risk-aversive way) assessed absorptive capacities are not surpassed and/or accumulation is checked 
or prevented. Non-renewable resources would be allowed to be exploited e.g. as long as proven 
reserves are sufficiënt to provide for consumption over a pre-determined minimum time span. 
Biological diverslty would not be allowed to deteriorate and safe minimum habitats and populations 
should be preserved. Moreover, also from different normative positions (that will not be discussed 
here) vis-a-vis (i) biodiversity and (ii) risk and uncertainty, one may opt for a precautionary demarca-
tion of the environmental space and the part of it that is judged to be accessible for economie 
utilisation -the other part being set aside for preserving biodiversity. 
In other words, strong sustainability is compatible with at least preserving the ecological infrastructu-
re and thus maintaining some amount of environmental space, or even with enlarging it, where weak 
sustainability would require only the total capital base (i.e., the economie value of the ecological 
infrastructure and human and produced capital) to at least remain equal over time. From a welfare 
maintenace perspective as is implied in the WCED-definition of sustainability, staying within the EUS 
is a sufficiënt, not perhaps a necessary condition for sustainability. Adding to sustainability the 
precautionary approach may imply that staying within the EUS becomes a necessary condition as 
well11. 
iL Institutions. Economics and Sustainability 
Unsustainability can be related to a range of societal processes and elements. Traditionally, it nas 
been linked to economie growth and population expansion, or to the combination of these. Other 
factors mentioned inciude short-sighted technological developments and poverty. Behind these 
forces, there are some more structural factors that economie expansion helps spreading over the 
globe. One such structural factor is Western cultural a prioris and world views (including views of 
humankind-nature relationships. Another one is that of institutional failure to accommodate to the 
emerging environmental realities. This Section looks at this type of failure in particular. 
The notion of 'institutions' is used here in the scientific sense, originally due to Veblen, i.e.: 
Consolidated pattems of human behaviour (formal and informal ones), as well as 
social conventions and organisations influencing human behaviour. 
In this sense institutions inciude both the organizations that give force to social conventions and the 
less tangible social structures governing particular aspects of human behaviour. As the degradation 
of the environment is the product of the independent decisions of billions of individual users of 
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environmental resources, the underlying causes of environmental degradation accordingly lie in the 
determinants of those individual decisions, including institutional elements such as: preferences, 
property rights, cultural, religious and legal restrictions on individual behaviour that prescribe the 
range of admissible actions, and economie aspects such as relative prices. 
Economics, as the late Jan Tinbergen used to describe it12, deals with the 'economie process' (i.e.. 
interactions between (groups of) individuals seeking satisfaction of wants) in relation to exogenously 
determined (changes in) the 'foundations' of the economie system (ie, its underlying political system, 
predominant norms and values, etc), the 'economie structure' (ie, the factor endowment, social 
structure and the derived production pattems; elasticities; market structures, etc) and the 'instru-
ments' used by society to direct or infiuence the economie process. 'Policy' or 'policy interventions' 
then can be defined as changing the levels at which the instruments are operated, or the economie 
structure or lts foundations. Tinbergen speaks of: (i) 'quantitative policies' when only the levels of 
instuments are changed, (ii) 'qualitative policies' when the economie structure is addressed, and (iii) 
'reforms' when the foundations are addressed. institutions as the phrase is used here, by definition 
play a role at the levels of the economie structures (e.g., elasticies and market structures) and 
foundations (eg, the predominant values and the politico-economic system). 
We begin by making some observations and recommendations on value-related issues, i.e. on the 
level of foundations. In an institutional or evolutionary approach to assessing the performance of the 
economie process one refers not only to static values such as efficiency and equity, but also to very 
fundamental values such as: the "nonindividious recreation of the community", and the "continuity of 
human üfe". When extrapolated to shed light on environmental issues, these two values imply as a 
corollary: environmental compatibility or 'coevolutionary sustainability'13. This can be illustrated as 
follows. The system of society-biosphere interactions is one in which several subsystems or modules 
interact and reproduce themselves. Among these subsystems are: (i) human population (compositi-
on, size, dynamics), (ii) technology and economie potentials and demands, (iii) the organizatio-
nal/administrative structure of society, (tv) culture/world view/ethics, and the environmental base. As 
soon as imcompatibilities between these modules arise, a process of structural adaptation will have 
to emerge within and between them. If this process is to be succesful in terms of survival, it will have 
to lead to changes in several of them and these adaptations must be mutually compatible. This in 
fact implies ecoiogical sustainability, as otherwise the economy's material base will be insecure and 
cause future imcompatibility. Taking a system's point of view, compatibility or viability appears to be 
the overall concept. We do assume that these basic social values are accepted in themselves, an are 
taken to have precedence over short term interests or private interests. The continued existence of 
species and ecosystems may be in this category of societally relevant items where individual 
preferences or priorities for them remain low. This may, at the collectrve level, give rise to explicit a 
priori policies on nature conservation etc, on non-economic grounds. All these arguments support 
the position that the environment is a 'merit-good' not to be decided upon by aggregate individual 
economie values attached to it14. In terms of Standard analysis, this means that we postulate a 
third and a fourth criterion in addition to efficiency and (intragenerational) equity, namely that of: 
coevolutionary sustainability (see above) and interspecies equity: a societally accepted element of 
care for the prospects of other species insofar as humankind can affect these prospects. 
In this paper the emphasis is not on values but on institutions. We are concerned to identify both the 
institutional causes of environmentally unsustainable behaviour, and the scope for policies to modrfy 
that behaviour, through quantitative policies, structural change and institutional reform. 
Typically in most economie analyses of environmental problems and the response to these, is to 
look at them form the perspecfrve of 'market and government failures'15. This actually is an 
extension of the usual approach in welfare and public finance economics, where 'market imperfecti-
ons' were identffied as a potential cause for government or public intervention in markets. Such 
market imperfections had to do with deviations in reality from the theoreticai preconditions for 
'perfect competition' on markets (such as monopolistic tendencies, externalities and 'public goods' 
features, rigidities and immobilities) and with socially undesirable market process outcomes such as 
a too skewed distribution of income. These led to a 'mixed economy' with a market and a public 
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sector, with goverments intervening in the market process through what Tinbergen would have called 
policy interventions and reforms (see above). In the more recent literature this approach has re-
emerged as 'market failure' analysis of environmental degradation. Meanwhile, the effectiveness as 
well as efficiency of policy interventions had increasingly become subjects for analysis and 
discussion, and hence the notion of market failure was complemented by '(govemment) intervention 
failure'. Below, these notions shall first be introduced according to the way they are normally 
presented; subsequently I shall attempt to put them in a wider and deeper context. 
Market Failures 
In market economies the decisions of resource users are co-ordinated by market forces. Market 
failure can be defined as the inability of the market to iead the economie process towards a social 
optimum; one main aspect of this is failure to encapsule in costs and prices the extemal effects, or 
reductions in utility and profits that agents other than those directly invdved in market transactions 
and the activities associated with these, have to undergo. In relation to environmental goods and 
services one may point at the externalities related to poJlution, resource exploitation and ecosystems' 
intrusion. Externalities are the result of intended or unintended 'cost shifting' or 'displacement of 
costs16'; that is, (part of the) adverse consequences of one actor's decision are passed on to 
others to bear (see below). 
Intervention Failures 
Button [15] defines intervention failures as: '...internal and external market failures which result from 
inappropriate actions (whether deliberate or not) of government'. He then divides these intervention 
failures into: (i) inadequacy in correcting market failure, and (ii) inappropriate policies elsewhere in 
the economy. In more practical terms, that is, looking at the operational mechanisms applied, 
intervention failures could be categorised into: 'economie intervention failures', 'regulation and 
control failure', and 'administrative failure'. Economie intervention failure has to do with qualitatively 
or quantitatively ineffective and inefficiënt policies; regulation and control failure are examples of 
ineffective and/or inefficiënt qualitatfve policies and reforms; administrative failure has to do with 
ineffective and/or inefficiënt organisation at the foundational level. Most studies on intervention failure 
deal with sectoral policy failure and administrative failure. 
Past sectoral policies (e.g. in the field of energy, agriculture and transportation) have often been 
decided upon primarily with the sectoral interests in mind, at best with some consideration for 
tradeoffs vis-a-vis other sectors. Environmental concerns have not -or not yet- been appropriately 
internaiised. Moreover, decision makers have limited time horizons and/or discount future conse-
quences of present decisions. Thus, policy formation may suffer from biases towards stronger (in 
terms of economie and politica) power or significance) sectors and against interests that cannot 
manifest themselves on current markets and in today's polrtical arena, such as future generations' 
interests. Sectoral policy failure often results in the subskJisation of sectoral activities. In resource 
related sectors such as agriculture, water, timber and energy, this leads to artificially low resource 
prices. In such cases, users of the products of these sectors are paying less than the social costs 
their use gives rise to; they thus are induced to consume more than would be the case were the 
price corrected for social costs. Prices thus may give the wrong signals and the sector may expand 
to levels beyond what is socially desirable. 
The notion of administrative failure refers to a range of problems within the organization of 
government at the various levels, leading to inadequate policy implementation. Examples include: 
rigidities due to entrenched traditional divisions of labour within administrative organizations (very 
often along sectoral iines), insufficiënt integration between agencies and departments, etc. 
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4. Bevond market and intervention failure 
The above perspectives and distinctions will now be put in a wider framework. 
Transaction failure, Empowerment failure and Government failure 
To begin with, I would argue that the range of environmentally relevant spontaneous social 
interactions is not fully captured by the market as an institution. Outside the market there are all 
kinds of multilateral and bilateral transactions with environmental and and economie significance. 
Beyond the market is social organisation itself, either non-governmental or governmental. I therefore 
propose that we incorporate into the analysis elements such as social mobilisation (failure) or 
(inadequate) countervailing power, and lack of public authority due to inadequate mandate given by 
society to its govemments, as two main categories of "empowerment failure". Hence I suggest we 
replace the market-government distinction by a trichotomy: transactions-empowerment-policy (see 
table 1). Inadequaeies at any of these three levels to achieve a social optimum (in our case taking 
sustainability into account) can be labeled "institutional failure". Market failure thus becomes one 
element of transaction failure, which in itself is one component of institutional failure. 
We have at least three kinds of transaction failure: (i) market svstem failure which includeSiboth 
inefficiënt markets (or market failure in the strict sense) and absence of markets, (ii) negotiation 
failure for all civil nonmarket transactions, covering both the situation where not all stakeholders are 
represented and that where they are, but suffering from bargaining power imbalances, and (iii) 
preference failures. Empowerment failure may occur at two levels: the non-governmental and the 
governmental. There may be a lack of social mobilisation to enable negotiation or demand-based 
market manipulation. Countervailing power at the non-governmental level is then inadequate. 
Secondly, there may be a lack of mandate at the govemment level to exert countervailing influence 
through policies, which should be addressed through politica) processes of authorisation leading to 
enhanced or more explicit mandates. Finally, government failure should include at least three catego-
ries: failures by government in formulating policies (either of intervention or of social mobilisation) to 
address unsustainability, failures in the intervention iself, and administratie failure. Some of these 
(sub-)categories may require elaboration. 
Causes of market and preference failure 
In order to understand the extent to which particular policies may be able to cope with market 
failures, their nature nas to be iooked at in more detail. The fundamental question is: what can be 
expected of markets? At their very best, markets co-ordinate in an efficiency-oriented way the 
decisions of billions of economie agents on how to aliocate the resources they can decide over. 
They have as wide a horizon in time, space and scale, as these economie agents themselves have. 
They are therefore not inherently geared to overall systems' performance in terms of distributional 
aspects and sustainability. Inequity and scale issues may easily arise out of an economie process 
that is driven by market forces (e.g., economie growth under such circumstances will push the 
economy outside the environmental space17). This in itself is one reason for policies addressing 
the economie process, such as social and environmental policies. Put in another way, without such 
corrective or preventative policies, the market system gives rise to cost shifting. Let us look at that 
notion in some more detail18. 
The practice of cost shifting is facilitated by what could be labeled as: 'distance-related distortions'. 
There are three such distortions, related to different types of distance, ie distance in time, in space 
and in scale. The consequences or effects of environmental degradation in relation to economie 
activities manifest themselves at often large distances from the source or agent causing them. This 
may be a distance both in terms of space and time (e.g., DDT in polar ice caps, chemical time 
bombs and climate change). Effects of environmental degradation ar thereby shtfted on to other 
peopie, to future people and even to other species. There is a third type of distance involved, namely 
that between the level of one's individual influence and the level at which a problem must be 
addressed for its soiution. One could refer to this as: distance in scale or in decision-level. Single 
actors in a multi-actor context may face situations where their privately optimal behaviour may lead 
to socially or collectively undesirable overall outcomes (the 'prisoners' dilemma' in the case of very 
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Table 1: A Classification of Environmentally Relevant Types of Institutional Failure 
Institutional Failure 
1: Transaction Failure 
1: Market System Failure 
Missing Markets 
Market Performance Fail-
ure 
2: Negotiation Failure 
Missing Parties 
Asymmetries in Bargaining 
Power 
3: Preference Failure 
Missing knowledge/infor-
mation 
Incomplete preferences 
Time Preference Bias 
II: Empowerment Failure 
4: Social Mobilisation Fail-
ure 
Missing/Inadequate Coun-
tervailing Power 
5: Authorisation Failure Missing/Inadequate Re-
mit/Mandate 
III: Government Failure 
6: Correction Failure Missing Policies (environ-
mental) 
7: Intervention Failure 
Environmental Policy Fail-
ure: 
-Targeting Failure (inade-
quate objectives) 
-Instruments Failure 
(quantitative, qualitative) 
-Entitlement Failure 
Other Policy Failures (sec-
toral and macroeconomic) 
8: Administrative Failure 
Integration Failure (hori-
zontal) 
Intervention Level Failure 
Enforcement/lmplemen-
tation Failure 
Source: Adapted f ram Opschoor et al 1994: Managing the Environment. OECD, Paris 
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few actors, or the 'tragedy of the commons' in the case of many actors). Examples are: countries 
sharing a common resource, individual fishermen exploiting a shared fish population, etc. In many 
cases, the absence of control and intervention by national or international authorities, ieads to an 
irrational exploitation of a shared or common property resource, to ongoing pollution, etc. 
Distance-related distortion facilitates cost shifting. Where such distance factors prevail and the party 
on which the burden is shifted cannot counteract this distance by pressing his interest, government 
intervention may be needed - unless the costs of intervention exceed the benefits of intervention. 
This is quite obviously the case with a range of environmental problems. Reasons why these 
"extemal" interests are not adequately internalised, include: 
a) absence of legally based "property rights' or 'access rights' protecting the damaged party, or of 
liability/accountability regulations enforceable upon the causal agent; 
b) absence of means to exert 'countervailing power' (Galbraith) through the political system (lack of 
voting power as in cases of transboundary cost shifting, or intertemporal cost shifting, or cost 
shifting onto other species), or through the market place (i.e. lack of purchasing power). 
Reasons why this situation is not easily changed by installing more appropriate institutions or 
legislation, include the filtering process applied by any political system in responding to claims for 
systemic changes: the filters (again) of time preference (whereby future effects and future interests 
are discounted away), and of present purchasing or voting power, both heavily biased in favour of 
the predominant economie and political forces. 
"Missing markets" relate to all situations where there is scarcity in a long-term perspective for a 
particular environmental component which, factually, is now dealt with as a free good; often, future 
demand for environmental goods is not reflected, property and access rights are not specified so as 
to lead to claims, etc. "Missing parties" include situations where allocational decisions are taken 
without all stakeholders being represented. Here again, future generations may be the most 
convincing example but in fact also other species could be regarded as stakeholders in many of the 
decisions now taken in the economie process. 
Even if all parties with an interest can go to an appropriate market or negotiation table, they may be 
inadequately informed or suffer from "detective telescopic faculty" (Pigou) or "weaknesses in human 
imagination" (Ramsey) as manifested by our time preference; this is captured by the category of 
'preference failure'. Preference failure Ieads to questions on the relevance of notions such as 'consu-
mer sovereignty' as undertying Paretan welfare economics and the alleged superiority of market 
allocations even if otherwise market structures are perfect. Other causes of preference failure have 
been indicated eariier; see the comments on vaiue hierarchies as made above. 
Government failure 
Failure to correct, ie, to intervene in the face of transaction failure or empowerment failure, is the first 
type of government failure. At the most fundamental level, government could 'go back' to society to 
renegotiate its own mandate, thus seeking correction of any kind of delegation failure that may have 
become manifest In Tinbergen's terminology, this is reform at the level of the foundations of the 
economie system. Given an adequate mandate, however, Governments may show correction failure 
in the sense that they fail to come up with -in this case- an environmental or sustainable develop-
ment policy. 
But if governments have environmental policies, these may fail in several respects. Here we shall go 
into the phenomenology of intervention failure; in a subsequent paragraph we shall look into the 
diagnostic and prescriptive aspects of it. 
Intervention failures as defined above, can be divided into policy failures and administrative failures. 
The term policy failure refers to the range of regulatory instruments, fiscal, exchange rate, monetary, 
price, income and other policies (including environmental policy) which distort the private cost of 
environmental resource use as to make it privately rational to damage the social heritage. One may 
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speak of policy failure in two rather different cases. 
1. When prevalent policies (relating to sectors other than environmental and resource 
management) are based on decisions in which ecological or environmental considerations were 
given insufficiënt weight. This very often is the case with sectoral policies where sectoral interests 
and powers have predominated over, or excluded ecological considerations, or with policies dating 
back to periods of time when environmental probJems were not yet perceived fully. Examples are: 
policies in the areas of agriculture, energy, transportation (see above). 
2. When environmental and resource policies inadequately address the social and ecological 
repercussions of economie activity, or are addressed at the wrong features. We restrict ourselves 
here to some more important cases: macro economie policies and price policies. 
Economie growth may be beneficial for obvious reasons, having to do mostly with the welfare it 
enables. Economie growth may also be consistent with the maintenance of environmental quality, 
and is certainly feasible over some finite time horizon. However, gK/en a finite resource base, and 
finite waste absorptrve capacity, an overall and global growth maximisation strategy might not be 
sustainable in the long run. Current macroeconomic policies may suffer from potential policy failure 
in so far as long term environmental effects are ignored. The risk is that the global society will be 
confronted with environmental costs that are either irreversible (e.g. species extinction) or very costly 
to redress (e.g. the impact of pollution in Northern Bohemia or deforestation in tropical zones). From 
a long run perspective the leveis of economie activities may have to be controüed and redirected to 
timely correct for this policy failure. This might be the case if changing the technologies or locations 
of our activities, would not provide sufficiënt responses to the ecological challenge. 
Perhaps the most environmentally significant of the policy failures are those which drive a wedge 
between the true social cost of resource use, and the cost to the individual user - the private cost of 
resource use. There exists a range of fiscal, exchange rate, price and income policies which have the 
effect of encouraging the over-utilisation of environmental resources. 
At the ievel of objectives, governments may fail in adequately expressing e.g. equity or sustainability 
considerations; they may fail to safeguard the preservation of an adequate 'portfolio' of environmen-
tal assets (or ecological infrastructure) to future generations. An important next element is that of the 
(re)definition and allocation of property rights (both collective and private rights) and rights of access 
and use, in the face of environmental scarcities. This could mean establishing entitlements over 
environmental resources, iiabilities for environmental damages, etc., with beneficiaries at alle relevant 
leveis: individuals, communities and groups, regions, governments themselves, e.g. as custodians of 
ecological infrastructure for future generations, international agencies, etc. At the instruments Ievel, 
governments may fail in selecting appropriate instruments (ie, they may have biases for or against 
economie instruments or command-and-control approaches, or for voluntary agreement and 
consensus-approaches, iike in the Netheriands). Other policies' failure covers what is usually meant 
by government or intervention failure and will not be dealt with further. Finally, there is administrative 
failure. The most fundamental probiem here is that of an approach at an inappropriate Ievel of 
intervention: either too low (e.g., attempting to solve the greenhouse issue by one small country 
alone) or too high. In a way, intervention Ievel failure may reflect empowerment failure, as is often 
the case with international, transboundary environmental problems where souvereignty and 
subsidiarity become relevant coniderations. But even if appropriate administrative leveis exist, they 
may not be used correctly. A second type of administrative failure is that of lack of (horizontal) 
coordination or integration leading to spillovers in the form of externalities to other compartments or 
sectors. Finally, practical impediments to appropriate enforcement and implementation are included 
here. 
Looking at table 1, it is easy to observe that a full scale approach to the causes of unsustainability in 
terms of institutional failure requires going far beyond market (performance) failure and policy failure 
as traditionally understood. This richer analysis may help in finding more appropriate answers to the 
question posed above: what are appropriate institutional settings from a sustainability perspective? 
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£. Intervention-. the Standard Approach 
if the economie process will not automatically move the economy towards a socially optimal allocati-
on, then the question arises as to how to address this. Standard economie analysis nas suggested 
two basic roads along which one might proceed: i) private negotiations and legal action, or ii) policy 
intervention directly aiming at an alteration of market prices (eg. through charges), or redefining and 
altering the structure of property rights (e.g. by licencing, zoning, standards etc). 
For road i): private actions, the point of departure normally taken, is Coase's theorem on bargaining. 
He nas suggested that a bargaining approach might suffice in reaching a social optimum. Polluters 
and victims of environmental degradation are assumed to negotiate about the optimal level of 
environmental degradation or of economie activity giving rise to tt, on the basis of their marginal 
damage costs and abatement costs. The mechanism assumed by Coase to operate, is the following. 
Left unregulated or in the absence of countervailing power from damaged parties, a polluter will try 
to operate at the level of activity where his profits are maximised. The social optimum is where the 
marginal profits are equal to the marginal damage due to the pollution. If the victim has legal rights 
to an unpolluted environment, then it could pay the polluter to compensate the victim . There 
allegedly is a 'natura!' tendency to move towards the social optimum. This is also assumed to be 
true in the case where the rights are with the polluter and the victim pays the polluter for abstaining 
from his activities. The 'Coase Theorem' in fact claims that regardless of who holds the property 
rights, there is an automatic tendency to approach the social optimum via bargaining. If this 
mechanism could be trusted to operate adequately in real world situations, then government regulati-
on of externalities would be redundant. Implicit in the analysis is, that intervention would be 
necessary only if the costs of reaching a bargain (the 'transaction costs') prove to be too high for an 
efficiënt solution to arise without it. These transaction costs include a range of elements d'rfficult to 
measure such as: the cost of information on the nature and extent of environmental damage and 
treatment costs, costs of identifying, finding and addressing the relevant parties (both the polluters 
and the poliutees) or appropriate representaties of these, the cost of convincing them to reach a 
mutually acceptabte agreement or the cost of litigation, etc. A number of criticisms of and complica-
tions with the Coasian approach have been ident'rfied and testify to the need for policy intervention. 
These include the lack of realism of various assumptions underiying the analysis such as the alleged 
market perfection, the level of transactions costs in actually achieving negotiation and bargaining on 
the level of pollution, and d'rfficulties in identifying and mobilising the relevant polluters and sufferers. 
There are thus many reasons why bargains do not, and cannot easiiy, occur. 
In the absence of bargains, there is a case for Government intervention (road ii). In fact, environ-
mental policies by govemments can be regarded as remedies for situations with high transaction 
costs and compliance/enforcement costs in the absence of such policies. Hence we proceed by 
looking into some theoretical possibilities for policy interventions: direct regulation via standards or 
zoning, taxes/charges, trading approaches, negotiation for agreements. 
a) charges and standards 
Pigou has advocated government intervention through the imposition of a tax on polluters based on 
the marginal (external) damage costs and the marginal abatement costs. The tax should induce 
polluters to automatically move to a socially optimal situation in terms of production and pollution 
abatement. However, in most cases it is impossible for an environmental agency to tax the pollution 
precisely at the appropriate level due to lack of adequate information on damage. The Pigovian 
solution has thus proven to be an impracticable one. "Proxy soiutions" to this problem have been 
proposed, such as emissions charges aimed at realising some specified level of reduction of 
emissions19, or a "Standard". Charges then would at least equaiise the level of marginal pollution 
abatement costs among firms, and thus provide an incentive for the most cost-effective total invest-
ment in pollution clean-up. One could regard the Baumol-Oates charge as a second-best alternative 
to the Pigovian charge, with Government allegedly making some assessment as to where the socially 
optimum emissions reduction objective might be located, based on an implicit social vaiuation of 
(marginal) environmental damages. 
Charges tend to be a Iower-cost method of achieving a given Standard or emission level, than a 
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uniform standards policy if marginal abatement costs differ between sources. Moreover, they will 
provide a stronger incentive to firms to identify and even develop clean technologies with lower 
marginal abatement costs, as the financial reward of that exceeds the benefits of a standards based 
approach (at least in cases of rising marginal abatement costs). 
b) TradeaWe rights or quota 
Marketable permits for emissions offer the same promise of efficiency as Baumol-Oates charges. By 
giving the polluters a chance to trade their pollution emission/discharge permits, the total cost of 
pollution abatement down to some predetermined acceptable level, is minimised. As long as 
polluters have different costs of abatement there is an automatic market - low-cost polluters selling 
permits and high-cost polluters buying them. The same reasoning applies to quota for exploiting a 
natural resource within some pre-established (sustainable) total yield. Trading ensures a cost-
effective total abatement result. For emission permit markets to function well, they have to meet a 
number of conditions; we list the more important ones. First, like in the case of charges, there have 
to be significant differences in marginal pollution abatement costs and technological options for 
cleaner production must not have been exhausted. Second, the market must be characterised by 
sufficiently large numbers of buyers and sellers. Third, the importance of the location of both sources 
and receptors must be of relatively minor importance. Fourth, the rules goveming the permits market 
must be simple and transparent. Tradeable permits could be seen as more compatible with Standard 
economie practice (e.g. by industry) than charges. Permit markets could, however, be complex in 
administratie terms, and the conditions determining there functioning may not all be met in reality 
(eg. in terms of the number of market parties and hence their relative market power, or in terms of 
their proximity). 
c) (Voluntary) Agreements 
One other form of intervention is that of negotiation between govemment or the environmental 
agency within government on the one hand, and (representatives of) polluters on the other. This may 
take the form of so-called "voluntary agreements" negotiated between the environmental agency and 
sectors of society, e.g. industries, consumer organisations, etc; the agreement will be on short and 
medium term changes in patterns of investment, technological change, consumption, waste treat-
ment, etc. These voluntary agreements may at first sight resemble negotiation and bargaining as 
described eariier, but there are important differences. First, this type of negotiation does not normal-
ly involve the exchange of environmental quality against financial transfers. Second, the damaged or 
potentiaily damaged parties do not participate in the negotiations. One could regard the role of 
governments in these voluntary agreements as taking place on behalf of society at large including 
the sufferers from environmental degradation; as in the case of the Baumol-Oates charge, govern-
ment might be assumed to seek for approximate a social optimum on the basis of some estimate of 
the marginal extemal damage costs. Also because these negotiations tend to be at the macro-meso 
level and tend not to be detailed enough to take into account locational aspects (of sources as well 
as receptors), this voluntary agreement is a second-best proxy only, but still one that could be 
better, from a point of view of effectiveness as well as efficiency, than that of no intervention. 
The above arguments have focused on allocative efficiency in the full sense of that phrase, or on 
cost-efficient approaches to predetermined environmental objectives or constraints set by environ-
mental policy. In a dynamic setting, environmental policy instruments have an impact on both the 
degree of technological innovation and the process of drffusion (or penetration) of new technology. 
Charges (as well as trading in emissions permits) in theory carry a dynamic incentive effect: they are 
assumed to augment the process of technological change almost by definition, as charges will 
always stimulate an interest in technologies that reduce pollution and the obligation to pay charges 
at a cost that is lower than the otherwise paid charge. Moreover, charges may not only induce an 
interest in end-of-pipe provisions that firms can operate at a cost lower than the charge, but they will 
wish to develop or buy inherently cleaner technologies that in practice very often prove to reduce 
normal production costs as well. Standards or non-tradable permits would lack this facility, often 
referred to as "X-efficiency" or "dynamic efficiency". 
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£. Intervention Reconsidered 
The Standard approach to intervention as reviewed above, appears to arrive at a coherent set of 
operational recommendations on how to intervene in the economie process: by putting in place 
some combination of economie instruments such that prices refiect the true costs of production and 
consumption, and the polluters/users of the environment pay for their pollution/use. 
From a theoretical perspective one could say that an intervention strategy based on economie 
instruments, once being put in place, would imply a rather restricted and quantitative, economie 
process oriented approach, rather than a broad one one addressing the economie structure or its 
foundations. And this might be rather shallow compared with the at least structural (if not foundatio-
nal) causes of unsustainability as analysed above. 
First, ft is a rather restricted approach even when it comes to quantitative interventions. Some 
empirically based observations20 underline this: 
1) Economie analyses do not always convincingly refiect economie realities. Real markets do 
not always work as theory assumes. The efficiency and effectiveness arguments associated with 
economie instruments are not always applicable, as a review of the history of environmental policy 
instruments discloses21. 
2) Non-economie instruments may produce equally well or even better than economie 
incentive; combinations of legal and economie approaches may turn out to be more promising22. 
3) Economie analyses and recommendations often ignore or play down realities typical of the 
political "arena" (Majone) in which (environmental) policy is shaped in reality. One aspect of this is 
the issue of the distributional implications of environmental policy and instruments choice. 
Secondly, there can be no single generally valid optimal intervention strategy, due to two sets of 
institutional or 'contextual' aspects: (i) differences in the structures (environmental, economie) in 
which the intervention is to operate (the 'application context'), and (ii) socio-political and cultural 
structures (the 'policy context'). 
Situation-specific characteristics relevant to the choice of instruments include source-related aspects 
such as: the availability of substitutes, elasticity, the potential for technological innovation, differenti-
ation in abatement costs, competitiveness, market structure related features; they also include 
impact-related issues such as the seriousness of environmental damage, local and temporal variation 
in linkages between emissions and impact, etc. In Tinbergen's terminology, these are structural 
aspects that may require a more structural (rather than purely quantitative) intervention appro-
ach23. 
Moreover, governments' choices of policy instruments have a strong political basis and may be 
governed by a variety of considerations, some more rational than others. Acceptability is an 
important one, next to the economically more obvious effectiveness and efficiency considerations. 
Acceptability is defined here as the extent to which the instrument can be propeiiy implemented and 
enforced without running into problems of non-concordance with existing regulations, principles and 
policies, or of resistance by target groups or indirectly affected agents, on the basis of allegedly 
unfair or unproportional burden-sharing implications (equity considerations)24. These arguments 
(on application context and on policy context) show that political. institutional and even cultural 
deveiopments may influence the process of articulation of environmental policy objectives and 
strategies, and of instruments selection. 
Thirdly, given the deep-rooted causes of unsustainability (see above) I doubt whether altering the 
stringency with which existing quantitative instruments are applied, or even whether adding to that 
set of quantitative instruments, are sufficiënt interventions in terms of achieving sustainability. One 
has to reaiise more profound changes. We are talking of using instruments in such as way that the 
economie structures are changing. We are even talking of altering the very foundations on a Iarge 
set of issues related to the economie process. Basically, what is impiied in the analysis so far, 
amounts to an argument in favour of alterations at the level of rights, responsibilities and power 
relationships25, such that environmental quality claims and existence rights (of species), etc. are 
recognised, coupled with compensations to be made by those inflicting upon those rights. 
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,7. Institutional improvements towards Sustainable Economie Development 
Some main iessons since the eariy '60s are that there will be a need for (i) redirecting growth, and 
perhaps for (ii) curbing growth (at least where it has become ecologically inviable), and (iii) that 
these objectives require new institutions and instruments capable of achieving the necessary 
entitlements and powers. Below we will present a general introduction to institutional changes that 
these Iessons give rise to; in the subsequent Section we pay special attention to conceivable interna-
tional institutional implications. 
Redirecting economie growth 
From a structural perspective, society needs to prevent or reduce cost shifting tendencies so that 
prices reflect (marginal) social costs and thereby provide appropriate and correct signals to decision 
makers in the economie and political process. This requires an institutional reduction of the impact 
of distances between cause and effect in space, time and decision level (see Section 4). 
- Proper pricing policies may make far away environmental repercussions of economie behaviour 
count in decision making here and now; examples include direct price-oriented interventions such as 
charges and (the removal of) subsidies. 
- The use of safe minimum standards will be an essential part of any environmental policy supporting 
sustainable development and will indirectly result in prices reflecting environmental costs, if the 
standards are implemented and maintained. 
- But there will be many cases where it will be necessary to introducé new or extended legal 
arrangements for liability and accountability by changing the structure of property rights in environ-
mental resources and environmental effects. This may be particularly appropriate where the problem 
is one of local degradation as a consequence of unidirectional externality. In cases of internationaliy 
shared environments or environmental resources in common property, new legal and administrative 
institutions may be needed to facilitate the negotiation of acceptable outcomes (see the next 
Section). 
- Distance in time needs to be overcome by lifting the veil of time preference and by altering the 
preoccupation in the public sector with marters of immediate urgency. One form this could take is 
the adoption of some type of 'legacy principle', whereby countries agree to pass on to the next 
generation an environmental quality and environmental resource stock at least as large as the one 
they found. Institutionally, this would have to be compiemented by installing some authority or body 
to represent and defend future generations' (and possibly outher species') interests, e.g. an 
Ombudsman-type organization for this specific purpose. 
- The problems created by the distance in scale, or between decision levels can be overcome by 
creating platforms or authorities at ievels high enough to cope with the problem at hand; that is at 
least to negotiate, and preferably to have some authority over the joint resource or environment and 
their uses. Many of these problems are manifest at the international level (see next Section). 
• There is a need to review taxation policies and their foundations. In so far as scarcity is one 
justification for choosing tax bases, most current systems turn labour into an over-expensive factor 
of production and this reinforces tendencies towards unemployment. Ecotaxes are based on 
differences in environmental pressure or resource claims, and may be a very useful addition to the 
set of fiscal instruments, to repiace other types of taxes (as on labour or value added) so that more 
labour intensive and less environmental resource intensive production processes are favoured in a 
fiscally neutral way. 
Managing (curbing) economie growth 
This may be needed when even with the interventions and institutions discussed under 'redirection', 
economie growth would still lead to an overall environmental pressure beyond the EUS. Economie 
activities likely to bring societies near or beyond their EUS would have to be scrutinised for their 
environmental impacts. If these are unacceptable, and if there is no scope for reducing them by 
further technological innovation, then it may be necessary to restrict the level of economie activity in 
that particular sector ("volume-oriented" or "scale oriented" policies), e.g. by allowing that activity to 
expand only in sofar as critical ioads or safe mission standards are not exceeded26. This may 
ultimately result in changes of the overall patterns of production. Thus, there will be cases (especially 
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in the more intensively industrialised countries) where direct regulation of economie behaviour will be 
warranted or even preferable, e.g. from an efficiency or effectiveness point of view. Environmental 
policy thus inevitably requires extensions of the powers of the state into areas ( e.g. economie 
planning, pricing policy, sectoral ("volume-oriented") policies etc.) from where it is, in fact, currently 
seen to withdraw. 
Policies of curbing economie growth described so far, do not affect the basic forces underiying 
growth; they merely mitigate or curb the effects of these forces. Depending on how effective these 
growth-curbing policies are, more basic strategies might be needed. As we saw, growth tendencies 
are triggered by structural elements such as poverty or inequality; insecurity in a competitive and 
dynamic context; wrongly oriented technological innovation. 
Firstly then, society can stimulate technological innovation oriented towards: (i) reducing the 
environmental burden of economie activities (dematerialisation, decoupling), (ii) enhancing the 
environment's capacity to generate economie inputs (environmental productivity) and (iii) improving 
the ecological infrastructure. 
In the second place, poverty alleviation at the global level would both directly and indirectly reduce 
long term environmental pressure (see next Section). 
Thirdly, the most profound policy to prevent growth would be that of reducing market insecurity and 
competition. As this comes close to the very essence of our economie system, one cannot but hope 
that the environmental crisis can be resolved without having to consider changes as fundamental as 
these (see also the next Section). 
Basically what nas been recommended above, amounts to an alteration of rights such that 
environmental pressure is recognized as a new type of claim on livelihood, existence rights (of 
species), etc. to be compensated tor by those laying that claim, to those on whom the claim is being 
laid. Compensation will have to follow new regulations on rights of property of (and/or access to) 
environmental resources, accountability and liability. This could be in the form of an extension of the 
Polluter Pays Principle to not only the measures prescribed by environmental policy, but to damage 
costs (including ecological damage) in general. It might also entail developing a User Pays Principle, 
and a practically operational Precautionary Principle. Each of these principles would have to be 
worked into the mandates and regulations of the major national and international institutions and 
new institutions would have to be created to ensure the interests of those stakeholders that have 
hitherto been neglected: 
-those groups (in the present generation) with little purchasing power and political clout; 
-future generations 
-other species. 
Another extension might be that non-compliance with agreed or prescribed practices be punishabSe 
much more heavily than is currently done, or that some ex ante 'performance bond' be made 
possible to be returned upon behaviour according to agreement. 
Such fundamental reversals in legal status of polluters vis-a-vis pollutees, will not easily come about 
and may need political mobilization and coaiition formation between various ngo's and interest 
groups Ccountervailing power"). 
7. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
A special set of problems has to do with the regulation of access to resources in which there is no 
clear central authority. These are frequently referred to as the problems of the global commons. 
Access to every public good involves a political process, in the course of which users cede rights to 
some decision making regulatory authority. This is most difficult in the case of ecological services 
that extend across a number of juridical boundaries: such as a number of biogeochemical cycles, 
the upper atmosphere or biodiversity. The biosphere only allows a limited "amount" of effective 
metabolism on the environment-economy interface, even if this limit can be extended through 
scientific and technological advance. 'Metabolism' here is the sum of resources (matter and energy) 
mobilized by society and its wastes and pollution released into the environment. Prevailing 
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inequalities and persistent tendencies of production growth in all societies, lead to an accelerated 
and insaturable growth push bringing the global economy beyond the levels of effective metabdism 
that the biosphere can sustain. Thus, globally and in a long term perspective, the situation is one of 
inherent insecurity and unsustainability. 
Necessary (perhaps not even sufficiënt) steps to alter this include the establishment of: 
a) effective global redistributive mechanisms and institutions 
Sustainable global development implies international institutions capable to change 
prevailing distributions of incomes and current distributions of access to sources of 
income and wealth, including environmental resources and world markets. This, 
therefore, is a question not just of aid, but also of trade and technology. Here we 
confine the exposé to some comments on institutional aspects. 
In the area of the establishment of fair shares in future carbon emissions, distributi-
onal issues prove to be tremendous stumbling blocks. Most work on strategie 
behaviour of parties to international negotiations over common property resources 
indicates the importance of transfers as instruments of international environmental 
policy. This raises a number of practical issues concerning, for example, the precise 
role of international institutions, such as the World Bank, and UNEP, in the process. 
It also raises the issue of conditionality. Certain forms of transfer are already linked 
to the adoption of environmental reforms -e.g. 'debt-for-nature'-swaps. One of the 
most promising suggestions is that relief be offered on debt servicing obligations in 
exchange for a range of reforms, the principal being written off only as specific 
targets are fulfilled. Other forms of 'green conditionality' are now commonly attached 
to development assistance, and the World Bank has used its leverage in a number of 
countries to promote the development of Environmental Action Plans. 
Apart from redistribution of financial resources and environmental quota, there are 
other issues such as the one of the redistribution of knowledge and intellectual 
property. 
b) effective resource management and enforcement facilities 
In cases of internationally shared environments or commonly used environmental 
resources, legal and administrative institutions may be needed for more appropriate 
management, and for resolving disagreements about actual use. This often means 
establishing new types of jurisdiction at high administrative levels. The International 
Rhine Committee is an example of such a new institution (but one without enough 
authority), and so are the North Sea Conferences. This point leads to questions 
related to souvereignty and jurisdiction. Transfers of sovereignty to international 
institutions in the area of natura! resources and environmental management, will be 
necessary both in view of global problems and with regard to regional and sub-
regional components of the biosphere. They will also take the form of engagements 
in agreements and conventions on the use of global resources and ecosystems, on 
biological diversity, on the rights of future generations and on the rights of other 
species; etc. 
There should also be an international environmental authority (wfthin the UN-system) 
with a mandate, the competence and the instruments to effectively implement a 
global sustainability oriented policy. This authority (wherever it is vested: in UNEP, in 
a special Security Organisation, in ECOSOC, or elsewhere) is to: 
-coordinate multilateral work in the areas of environmental quality, natural resources 
and biological diversity; 
-set international standards and have the power to monitor and even enforce 
adherence; 
-settle disputes between nations on transboundary environmental and resource 
problems; 
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-etc. 
c) reforming muitilateral development structures 
Firstly, sustainability-oriented mechanisms are needed for price setting on world 
markets. In cases where environmental effects are redistributed via the world market 
mechanism (international trade and investment), these effects have to become 
known and visible. and (where needed) to be transferred into changing regulations 
on international trade (e.g. GATT/WTO-rules, international price regulation, etc). This 
will especially be the case when North-South trade results in unsustainable pattems 
of production in developing countries, or where developing countries are (e.g. as a 
consequence of international debt servicing obligations) are forces to sell out natural 
resources on the world market. The Polluter Pays Principie (extended to: User Pays) 
should be a central principie in the new WTO-charter, and so should the notion of 
minimum sustainability standards, to be translated into adequate process standards 
to be set by governments in order to avoid the risk of being suspected of 'green 
dumping'. 
Secondly, the World Bank and IMF-mandates and structures may require revision in 
the light of sustainable development. The World Bank has moved far along this road 
in theory, but this needs to be entrenched in the realities of Bank-sponsored 
operations. IMF is beginning to give environmental matters some thought, but this is 
far from adequate. Accepting the necesstity of development but underlining that 
development is to be sustainable, one must question the Bank's and Fund's strategy 
of fostering unrestricted trade liberalisation and export-led growth that is implicit in 
WB and IMF interventions. Strengthening economies by developing domestic and 
regional markets might even be precautious from a sustainability point of view. 
d) institutions and mechanisms for changing global pattems of production and con-
sumption 
Poverty aileviation at the global level will come about only via economie develop-
ment and growth, implying additional environmental burdens in the short run. 
Poverty aileviation without changing the quality of economie growth, is a cul-de-sac. 
Given the present distribution of per capita environmental claims as well as welfare 
levels, it is obvious that there are to be substantial quantitative changes as well, and 
that these have to come in the West first: qualitative changes in East and South will 
only come about in sofar as the consumption pattems in the West will manifestly 
reflect new environmental values and if there is an explicit willingness on the side of 
the richer countries to assist the poorer countries in accomplishing reorientations in 
their production pattems whilst guaranteeing them rising material per capita welfare 
levels. This requires a drastic reorientation (sometimes reduction) of consumption 
and production in the North: new l'rfestyles and ecologized production pattems. 
There is no institutional structure in place to ensure that effective and equitable 
reconsideration and change of pattems of production and consumption will take 
place; it is here that I see the major shortcoming in the muitilateral institutional 
structure. 
& Conclusions 
Sustainability can be defined in several ways but in this analysis it refers to the maintenance of the 
ecological infrastructure as defined in Section 2. This gives scope for society using the environment: 
the 'environmental utilisation space' (EUS). Societies have to identify and embark upon a feasible 
and acceptable level of environmental utilisation that they wish to enjoy sustainably - if such a level 
that is both acceptable and sustainable exists. From a welfare maintenace perspective as is implied 
in the WCED-definition of sustainability, staying within the EUS is a sufficiënt, not perhaps a 
necessary condition for sustainability. Adding to sustainability the precautionary approach may imply 
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that staving within the EUS becomes a necessary cond'ition as well. The main question addressed in 
this paper is: what institutional conditions and changes might foster sustainabJe deveiopment and 
development towards sustainabllity? 
As environmental degradation is intimately linked with economie activities, we are interested in the 
institutions that shape and/or affect the 'economie process': the 'foundations' of the economie 
system (ie, its underiying politica! system, predominant norms and values, etc), the 'economie 
structure' (ie, the factor endowment, social structure and the derfved production pattems; elasticities; 
market structures, etc) and the 'instruments' used by society to direct or infiuence the economie 
process. Normally in economie policy, attention is focused on issues of efficiency, and -to a lesser 
degree- of equity. Environmental or ecological economics cannot be satisfied with that, if the EUS is 
to be respected as presenting an ecological constraint on long-term economie development. A third 
and even a fourth criterion are needed: coevolutionary sustainability and interspecies equity: a 
societally accepted element of care for the prospects of other species, insofar as humankind can 
effect these prospects. 
Typically, economie analyses of environmental problems and the response to these, look at them 
form the perspective of 'market and govemment failures'. In this paper the conceptual framework is 
broadened to: Transaction failure, Empowerment failure and Government failure. OutskJe the market 
structure there are all kinds of multilateral and bilateral transactions. Beyond that, and even 
underiying the level of transactions, is social organisation itself, either non-governmental or 
governmental. I propose we incorporate into the analysis elements such as social mobilisation 
(failure) or (inadequate) countervailing power, and lack of public authority due to inadequate 
mandate given by society to its governments, as two main categories of "empowerment failure". 
Inequity and scale issues may easily arise out of an economie process that is driven by market 
forces (e.g., economie growth under such circumstances will push the economy outside the 
environmental space. Without correctfve or preventatfve policies, the market system gives rise to 
cost shrfting. This is facilitated by 'distance-related distortions', related to different types of distance, 
ie distance in time, in space and in scale. 
The Standard approach to these is to put in place some combination of economie instruments such 
that prices reflect the true costs of production and consumption, and the polluters/users of the 
environment pay for their pollution/use. However, this is a rather restricted approach even when it 
comes to quantitative interventions. Moreover, there can be no single generally valid optimal 
intervention strategy, as policies have to operate in different 'contexts': (i) differences in the structu-
res (environmental, economie) in which the intervention is to operate (the 'application context'), and 
(ii) socio-political and cultural structures (the 'policy context'). 
Thirdly, given the deep-rooted causes of unsustainability (see above) I doubt whether altering the 
stringency with which existing quantitative instruments are applied, or even whether adding to that 
set of quantitative instruments, are sufficiënt interventions in terms of achieving sustainability. One 
has to realise more structural changes and systems' reforms: rights, responsibilities and power relati-
onships, such that environmental quality claims and existence rights (of species), etc. are recogni-
sed, coupled with compensations to be made by those inflicting upon those rights. 
There is a need for institutional change and reforms in the areas of: (i) redirecting growth, and 
perhaps for (ii) curbing growth (at least where it has become ecologically inviable). 
1) Institutions are required that are capable of safeguarding that the economie process stays within 
the environmental utilisation space: safe standards, zoning etc. will have to be applied and enforced. 
Environmental agencies will have to be emprowered to take structural or volume-oriented measures 
wherever this is needed. 
2) Ombudsman-type institutions may be required to represent and defend future generations' 
interests, and perhaps other species' interests. 
3) Proper pricing in a framework of appropriate entitlements, liabilities and responsibilities will have to 
back this up and enhance society's efficiënt use of its environmental space. Tax reform and financial 
accountability (Polluter and User Must Pay) can achieve that. 
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4) Institutional reform must ensure that basic driving forces of unsustainability are adrressed (e.g. 
effective reductions in poverty and insecurity) or neutralised (e.g. appropriate technoiogical 
innovation). This has repercussions for existing international institutions (GATT/WTO, World Bank, 
IMF, etc), but a number of areas have been identified in which institutions or mechanisms appear to 
be lacking, e.g.: (i) redistribution of weaith and access to EUS; (ii) regional and global resource 
management; (iii) changing patterns of production and consumption. 
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